On the role of emotions in experimental litigation contests by Ansgar, Wohlschlegel
 
Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
International Review of Law and Economics
                                                  
   





Eisenkopf, G., Friehe, T. & Wohlschlegel, A. (2019).  On the role of emotions in experimental litigation contests.













This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 














We present experimental evidence on the influence of emotions on litigation, using
a stylized litigation contest in which a potential plaintiff can make a costly effort to
regain points that had been transferred to the potential defendant before. In our
design, we compare data from a treatment in which any transfer of points happens
only when a player decided to take points from the other one (i.e., in which takings
are intentional) to data from a treatment in which transfers are initiated by chance
(i.e., takings are random events). Takings that are intentional induce negative emo-
tions (e.g., anger), but this emotional arousal does not influence litigant behavior
in terms of either filing a case or spending litigation effort. Our observation is in-
dependent of litigation being a one-staged or a (possibly) two-staged contest (i.e.,
one with an appeal).
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Legal experts often argue that litigation costs are excessive, as many litigants bring low-
merit suits and devote too many resources to the lawsuit. Potential causes for excessive
legal spending include rent-seeking incentives (e.g., Katz 1988) and emotions calling for
retaliation. In support of this latter factor, emotions, as a key driver of decisions in
litigation such as filing, settlement, and effort decisions, theoretical considerations (Huang
and Wu 1992; Baumann and Friehe 2012), interviews with lawyers (Farnsworth 1999),
field data from divorce cases (Farmer and Tiefenthaler 2001), and survey data (Robbenolt
2006) have been presented. We use a laboratory experiment of a stylized litigation contest
in order to isolate the role of emotions for behavior in such a strategic setting as the
laboratory environment helps identifying crucial variables and causal relationships in
litigation that are typically obscured in real legal contexts, facilitating the test of specific
theoretical hypotheses.
Our experiment is designed so as to arouse similar emotions in the participant in
the role of the plaintiff as those of a real-world plaintiff. To this end, the experimental
litigation contest is put into the context of a transfer of points, which have previously
been earned in a real-effort task, from the participant in the role of the plaintiff to that in
the role of the defendant. By succeeding in the litigation contest, the plaintiff can achieve
a reversal of this transfer of points. In order to study how emotions impact the plaintiff’s
decision-making, we follow the approach by Landeo and Spier (2009) by considering two
types of treatments: In the endogenous treatment, the transfer of points results from
the defendant’s choice, whereas it is entirely random and unswayable for the defendant
in the exogenous treatment. While the transfer can be expected to induce negative
emotions such as anger or irritation for the plaintiff in either treatment,1 we hypothesize
that these emotions are stronger in the endogenous treatment and find empirical support
for this hypothesis in our data.2 Our main result is that, despite this difference in
1As argued by Dessalles (2010), an outcome that deviates significantly from a simple, easily accessible
counterfactual may be perceived as good or bad luck and, thereby, arouse emotions.
2For example, Friehe and Utikal (2018) establish that extra punishment results for bad intentions.
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the plaintiff’s negative emotions, participants in the role of the plaintiff do not make
significantly different decisions with regards to initiating a litigation contest or the effort
therein.
The role of emotions may also depend on the design of litigation. To address this issue,
we consider a scenario in which plaintiffs can appeal their case after losing in the first
instance. The plaintiff’s possibility of appeal makes winning in the first instance relatively
less important, possibly calling for a different effort level, and making the litigation contest
more attractive. These distinctions may be neglected by emotionally aroused plaintiffs.
In contrast, the potentially longer duration of the conflict may also induce a cooling-
off of the plaintiff. We find that plaintiffs in the treatment with possible appeals are
just as likely to initiate the litigation contest as those in the one-stage treatment and,
additionally, that they invest comparable effort levels.
Experimental evidence supporting that emotions such as anger are very relevant for
understanding retaliatory behavior such as punishment abounds (e.g., Bolle et al. 2014,
Bosman and van Winden 2002, Galeotti 2015, Reuben and van Winden 2008, Xiao and
Houser 2005, van Winden 2007). Our paper is also related to a small line of literature
using experimental economics to study decision-making in litigation, which has examined
the impacts of whether the judicial system is adversarial or inquisitorial (Block and
Parker 2004), of litigants delegating decisions to attorneys (Croson and Mnookin 1997)
and how this delegation is governed contractually (McKee et al. 2007), of the context of
settlement bargaining vis-a-vis a standard ultimatum game (Pecorino and Van Boening
2010), and of the cost allocation rule (Coursey and Stanley 1988 on settlement bargaining,
and Coughlan and Plott 1997 and Massenot et al. 2017 on litigation contest effort).
While Coughlan and Plott (1997) and Massenot et al. (2017) also analyze experimentally
decision-making in a litigation contest, neither of them considers the impact of emotions
thereon.
In the remainder of the paper, we will first discuss design and implementation of the
experiment, and then present the experimental results. Section 4 concludes.
Xiao and Houser (2005) report that punishment is a way of venting negative emotions.
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2 Experiment Design and Implementation
We considered a stylized litigation contest in which the plaintiff’s filing choice and effort
level were endogenous. We used a 2x2 between-subject design. The first treatment di-
mension distinguished whether or not appealing the outcome of the first-instance court
was possible. The second treatment dimension concerned whether the grounds for liti-
gation – namely, an unfair allocation of payoffs – resulted only when Player A chose to
take points from Player B (endogenous treatment) or resulted due to chance (exogenous
treatment).3
Subjects started off by participating in a real-effort task with a performance threshold
to earn the uniform endowment of 180 points. Failing the task ends the experiment for
both players in that pair who, in this case, only receive the show-up fee of 80 points. Next,
participants were matched into pairs of plaintiffs (Player B) and defendants (Player A)
and learned their role. We used neutral language such as ’Player A and Player B’ instead
of ’defendant and plaintiff’ throughout the experiment’s instructions.
In Stage 2, 100 points may be transferred from Player B to Player A. In the en-
dogenous treatment, Player A chose whether to take points from Player B or not. In
the exogenous treatment, the transfer probability is equal to the relative frequency with
which Players A in a pilot session chose to take Player B’s points, and its exact level was
not communicated to participants in order to retain comparability of the subjects’ infor-
mation across treatments. The pilot session was conducted before our main experiment
with different subjects.
If points have been transferred, Player B can, in Stage 3, decide whether and how
many points to invest in a stylized litigation contest that builds on the theoretical model
in Friehe and Wohlschlegel (2017). Higher investment implies a higher probability to
reverse the transfer of points. While Player B can select a level of effort from the set
[10, 30], Player A’s investment in any contest is fixed at 16 points in order to rule out
3Landeo and Spier (2009) use a similar strategy in the context of buyers’ reactions to an incumbent
seller’s offer of exclusive dealing contract, which may be exogenously given or chosen by the seller.
4
strategic uncertainty, which is known to make effort choices in experimental contests
very heterogeneous and to produce results that are hard to interpret (see Dechenaux et
al. 2015). An effort level of 16 results as the defendant’s equilibrium effort in Friehe and
Wohlschlegel (2017) when both litigants appeal a judgment in favor of the other party. In






where eP denotes the plaintiff’s effort. As a result, maximal investment induces a proba-
bility of winning amounting to less than 50 percent. After Player B’s litigation decision,
eleven emotions are elicited on a Likert scale from 1 to 7, where 1 represents the strongest
feeling of the emotion (Bosman and van Winden 2002).
Depending on the treatment, the plaintiff may be able to appeal in Stage 4 after losing
the litigation contest. To simplify the experiment and increase the predictability, both
players’ effort levels in the appeals stage are exogenously fixed at 9 points. In other words,
the plaintiff’s appealing the first outcome implies a fixed cost of 9 points for both parties.
Table 1 summarizes both players’ choices at each stage, depending on the treatment.
If Player B was risk neutral and motivated only by monetary payoff consequences,
her optimal trial effort choices, based on Player A’s exogenously given effort, can be
obtained using the theoretical model in Friehe and Wohlschlegel (2017). However, the
participants’ decisions are likely to be driven also by behavioral considerations: Against
the background of the preceding literature of fair intentions, we anticipate that players
will invest more effort and initiate the litigation contest with a higher likelihood and
higher effort when Player A intentionally took points from Player B. This hypothesis
reflects the idea that litigating may be considered as an act intended to reciprocate the
unfair act of the defendant (e.g., Rabin 1993).
Possible implications from the availability of an appeals stage may be related to
the literature on cooling-off periods (e.g., Neo et al. 2013, Oechssler et al. 2015). For




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of disappointment. When appeals are possible, the final word is not spoken in the first
litigation contest such that less depends on the immediate reaction of the plaintiff to the
transfer of points. Moreover, the decision about whether or not to appeal happens after
having made the effort decision and awaiting the move of nature, allowing for some cooling
off of the plaintiff. We thus expect differences across one-staged and potentially two-
staged litigation contests. However, since we do not have a forced delay, any differences
might turn out to be moderate. For example, Neo et al. (2013) use a forced delay of 15
minutes.
The experiment was conducted between August and November 2017 at the University
of Hamburg’s economic laboratory, using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) for programming and
hroot (Bock et al., 2014) for organizing and administrating the experiment. On average,
each session of the experiment lasted about 45 minutes (including payment), and the 204
participants earned a total of about 11 Euro on average.
3 Results
Manipulation Check We are interested in the role of emotions on litigation. We
hypothesized that intentional taking makes people angrier than an exogenous transfer.
Table 2 shows results from an ordered-probit estimation of some emotions of Player B
with a dummy indicating whether points had been transferred, a treatment dummy equal
to 1 for the exogenous treatment, and the interaction of these dummies as independent
variables.
As expected, the significantly negative coefficient for the transfer dummy variable in
the first column, for instance, shows that anger is higher after a transfer of points than
without it conditional on being in the endogenous treatment (as a lower value of the
anger variable means a stronger emotion). Similarly, irritation and sadness are higher
and joy is lower after a transfer in the endogenous treatment.
In order to check whether the manipulation using the endogeneity of the transfer
was successful, it is not sufficient to just compare average emotion levels between both
7
treatments in those cases where the transfer took place, as the significant coefficients
of the dummy variable for the exogenous treatment in Table 2 shows that emotions
differ significantly between treatments even if no transfer happened. Hence, we need
a difference-in-differences estimator of how the emotional reaction to a transfer differs
between treatments, which is achieved by the coefficient of the interaction term. For
the estimation of anger in the first column, for instance, this coefficient is significantly
positive, which means that experiencing a transfer in the exogenous treatment is not
associated with intense anger as it is in the endogenous treatment. We observe similar
effects for related emotions.
Table 2: The Impact of a Transfer of Points on Player B’s Emotions.
Dep. Var. Anger Irritation Sad Joy
Transfer -2.181*** -1.707*** -1.156** 2.332***
(0.588) (0.571) (0.584) (0.578)
Exogenous -0.941** -0.866*** -0.633** 0.641**
(0.321) (0.317) (0.317) (.314)
Interaction 1.112*** 0.735* 0.751* -0.803**
(Transfer × Exogenous) (0.400) (0.393) (0.402) (.395)
Pseudo-R2 .045 .049 .012 0.089
Notes: N = 132 in all estimations; *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. All models report results from
ordered-probit estimations of the respective emotions. Emotions are measured on a scale from 1 (strong
emotion) to 7 (no emotion).
Litigation Rates and Effort Levels Table 3 summarizes the data on both players’
decisions. Players A chose to take points from their counterpart about half the time,
whereas Players B reacted to takings of their points by initiating the litigation contest
in the vast majority of cases. Furthermore, conditional on having initiated the contest,
Players B chose high effort levels. As a comparison, the last row of Table 3 displays the
equilibrium effort choices for the case where both players are risk neutral and only care
about monetary payoffs, which were obtained using Friehe and Wohlschlegel (2017). The
actually observed effort choices significantly exceed the point predictions of the theoret-
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ical model (p < .01, according to the Wilcoxon signed-rank test). Figure 1 shows the
frequency of Player B’s effort choices by treatment and suggests that this over-investment
in effort might have been even more pronounced if it wasn’t for the cap on effort: In all
four treatments, most Players B who had entered the contest chose the highest possible
effort level of 30 points.
Table 3: Summary Statistics.
Appeal Player B can appeal No appeal
Transfer Treatment endog. exog. endog. exog.
Taking/Groups in treatment 14/30 14/20 26/51 22/31
(46.7%) (70.0%) (51.0%) (71.0%)
Contest started/Groups with taking 13/14 12/14 20/26 17/22
(92.9%) (85.7%) (76.9%) (77.3%)
Average effort 26.2 26.4 28.3 25.9
Equilibrium effort for pure
expected monetary payoff maximizers 24.3 24.6
We use two-sided non-parametric tests (Wilcoxon Ranksum test, Fisher exact test) to
analyze how participants’ decisions differ across the treatments. We start by examining
our main research question and exploring differences in the average effort levels and
litigation rates for each appeals regime under endogenous and exogenous taking. The
main result of our paper is that we do not find any significant difference in litigation
(second line in Table 3) or effort decisions (third line) between the endogenous and the
exogenous treatment (all relevant p-values > 0.5).
In addition to the implication of an endogenous instead of an exogenous taking, we
were interested in the potential role of the possibility to appeal. Our experiment allows
for analyzing whether Player B’s possibility to appeal a judgment in favor of Player A has
an effect on participants’ choices or their difference under endogenous versus exogenous
taking of points. Note first that Player B lost in 13 of the 25 cases in which appeals
are possible, points were transferred to Player A, and Player B started a contest. In one
9
Figure 1: Frequencies of Player B’s Litigation Effort Choices.
out of three such cases in the endogenous treatment and in three out of ten such cases
in the exogenous treatment did Player B actually appeal the judgment, suggesting that
this possibility may only be of limited relevance for participants. Furthermore, even if
players anticipate plaintiffs to use this opportunity whenever possible, the theory does
not predict a sizeable impact of this possibility on Player B’s earlier decisions (see the
last row of Table 3). Indeed, litigation rates are, on average, slightly higher if Player B
can appeal (89.3%) compared to the scenario without appeal (77.1%), but this difference
is statistically insignificant (p = 0.242, χ2-test). Furthermore, average effort conditional
on having initiated the contest seems independent of whether or not appeal was possible.
Note that this lack of difference in Player B’s decisions between the treatments with
and without the possibility of appeals seems to be correctly anticipated by Players A,
as the proportion of Player A taking points from Player B in the case where taking is
endogenous does not differ significantly between these treatments either.
To complement our direct, non-parametric test of the treatment effect, we also test
the impact of emotions when controlling for the treatment. Table 4 confirms our non-
parametric results by showing that the filing decision in both treatments is not statistically
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different even when controlling for emotions. As for the impact of emotions on the filing
decision, the table shows that anger, irritation and joy do not have any significant effect
on the plaintiff’s filing choice. However, for a given treatment, a stronger feeling of
sadness makes a plaintiff significantly less likely to file suit (on the 10%-level).4
Table 4: The Impact of Emotions on Filing Decision.









Exogenous -0.014 -0.014 -0.169 0.038
(0.405) (0.401) (0.424) (0.410)
Appeal 0.562 0.571 0.415 0.585
(0.404) (0.403) (0.421) (0.406)
Pseudo-R2 0.037 0.038 0.093 0.045
Notes: N = 76 in all estimations; *** p < .01; ** p < .05; * p < .1. All models report results from
Probit estimations of the plaintiff’s filing choice (dependent variable = 1 if plaintiff files suit). Emotions
are measured on a scale from 1 (strong emotion) to 7 (no emotion).
4There is some weak indication for the effect of emotions to vary across treatments. When we look at
the Probit results for the endogenous and the exogenous treatments separately, the coefficients for anger,
irritation and joy have opposite signs across treatments. Similarly, we looked at the interaction between
emotions and the exogenous treatment dummy within a Tobit model of the effort choice that reflects
the fact that plaintiffs who chose not to start a litigation contest had an optimal litigation effort of at
most 9. This interaction is significantly positive at the 10%-level for anger and irritation, which means




We report results from an economic experiment on behavior in a potentially multi-staged
litigation contest. Our focus was on the role of emotions for the plaintiff’s choices of
whether or not to bring the case and how much litigation effort to invest. Variation in
emotions was introduced by distinguishing between two treatments in which the transfer
of points was either intentional or random. While emotions are stirred up by the treatment
variation, there are no differences in litigant choices.
Our data indicate that the results from the experimental literature on emotions and
punishment (e.g., Xiao and Houser 2005) do not carry over to our game, in which the only
way for Player B to punish Player A’s antisocial behavior was by initiating a litigation
contest and, therefore, less direct than in that literature. This finding may be seen
as related to the result of Pecorino and van Boening’s (2010) experimental study of
settlement bargaining, which they implement as an ultimatum game that is embedded
within the wider context of litigation in the sense that rejecting an offer means that the
amount that the defendant has to pay to the plaintiff is determined stochastically and
both players bear a fixed dispute cost. They find that much lower offers are made and
accepted than in pure ultimatum bargaining games. Both their and our results indicate
that established results from well-known experimental games may be markedly weaker
if these games are put into a wider strategic context. A potential avenue for future
research might be to explore more generally how the impact of emotions on the incidence
of punishment depends on the particular way in which this punishment is implemented
in the experiment.
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